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SUMMARY
This paper explores the utility of cluster- and case-based surveillance established in government
hospitals in Bangladesh to detect Nipah virus, a stage III zoonotic pathogen. Physicians listed
meningo-encephalitis cases in the 10 surveillance hospitals and identified a cluster when 52 cases
who lived within 30 min walking distance of one another developed symptoms within 3 weeks of
each other. Physicians collected blood samples from the clustered cases. As part of case-based
surveillance, blood was collected from all listed meningo-encephalitis cases in three hospitals
during the Nipah season (January–March). An investigation team visited clustered cases’
communities to collect epidemiological information and blood from the living cases. We tested
serum using Nipah-specific IgM ELISA. Up to September 2011, in 5887 listed cases, we
identified 62 clusters comprising 176 encephalitis cases. We collected blood from 127 of these
cases. In 10 clusters, we identified a total of 62 Nipah cases: 18 laboratory-confirmed and 34
probable. We identified person-to-person transmission of Nipah virus in four clusters. From case-
based surveillance, we identified 23 (4%) Nipah cases. Faced with thousands of encephalitis cases,
integrated cluster surveillance allows targeted deployment of investigative resources to detect
outbreaks by stage III zoonotic pathogens in resource-limited settings.
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INTRODUCTION
Stage III zoonotic pathogens spill over from animals
to humans, but because their basic reproduction num-
ber (R0) is <1, they produce only stuttering chains of
person-to-person transmission that terminate [1].
Nevertheless, stage III zoonotic pathogens represent
a risk for human pandemics, because the transmissi-
bility of individual strains varies and each chain of
transmission provides an opportunity for evolutionary
adaptation of the pathogen to human hosts [2–4].
Some stage III zoonotic pathogens including Nipah
virus (NiV), influenza virus and Middle East respirat-
ory syndrome coronavirus have a high human fatality
rate [4–7]. If one strain of stage III pathogens with a
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high fatality rate acquires the capacity of efficient
person-to-person transmissibility (R0 > 1), it may pro-
duce a devastating global pandemic [2]. Effective sur-
veillance for pandemic threats would permit early
identification of potentially pandemic strains, monitor
the change in viral transmissibility between humans [8]
and support early initiation of public health responses.
Focusing surveillance on clusters of cases that are
linked temporally and geographically and so are
more likely to represent person-to-person transmission
is potentially an efficient strategy for deploying limited
surveillance resources to identify pandemic threats.
Nevertheless, a single surveillance strategy may not
always be adequate to achieve multiple purposes and
therefore, integration of multiple surveillance strategies
may be more effective. There are limited examples of
such integration for the stage III pathogens.
NiV is a stage III zoonotic pathogen that has
caused recognized fatal outbreaks in Bangladesh
almost every year since 2001 [9–11]. Between 2001
and 2007, 87% of the identified Nipah cases in
Bangladesh died [7]. Drinking raw date palm sap
contaminated with bat saliva or urine that contains
NiV is the main transmission route between Pteropus
bat, the reservoir host of NiV, and the popula-
tion in Bangladesh [7]. In many identified Nipah out-
breaks in Bangladesh, we found no evidence of
person-to-person transmission. Nevertheless, in sev-
eral outbreaks people who came in direct contact
with secretions of Nipah cases, also became infected
through person-to-person transmission [10, 12, 13].
In 2006, the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease
Control and Research (IEDCR) of the Government of
Bangladesh, with the collaboration of the International
Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh
(icddr,b) introduced year-round surveillance focused
on identification of encephalitis clusters in 10 govern-
ment hospitals and subsequent investigation of identified
clusters. The objective was to identify encephalitis out-
breaks including NiV at an early stage, to understand
the risk factors and transmission pathways, and to intro-
duce timely public health interventions to contain the
identified outbreaks.
Since the identified NiV outbreaks in Bangladesh
had all occurred during January–March, IEDCR
and icddr,b also expanded surveillance activities spe-
cifically during this Nipah transmission season to
screen all individual meningo-encephalitis cases admit-
ted in three surveillance hospitals for NiV, even when
they were not part of a cluster [7]. We designated this
expansion of surveillance as case-based surveillance.
This paper describes the performance of cluster-
based surveillance in detecting stage III zoonotic patho-
gens, explains features of cluster-based surveillance
to monitor their person-to-person transmissibility and
explores the added benefits of nested case-based surveil-




In February 2006, IEDCR and icddr,b established ac-
tive surveillance in three tertiary and seven district-
level government hospitals in northwest and central
Bangladesh (Fig. 1). In February 2007, four district hos-
pitals were converted to passive surveillance sites be-
cause few encephalitis patients were admitted to those
hospitals. Passive sites only reported to IEDCR and
icddr,b if they identified an unusually large number of
meningo-encephalitis cases. Surveillance physicians in
the remaining six active sites reported clusters as soon
as they were identified and the total number of encepha-
litis cases admitted monthly.
Activities in surveillance hospitals and cluster
identification
Surveillance physicians listed admitted patients in pae-
diatric and adult medicine wards with suspected
meningo-encephalitis, defined as fever (axillary tempera-
ture >38·5 °C) with recent altered mental status or seiz-
ure or other neurological deficits suggestive of either
diffuse or localized brain injury. Surveillance physicians
recorded detailed addresses and phone numbers of listed
cases and identified if they were from the same com-
munity. In their communities in order to identify ad-
ditional encephalitis, physicians asked admitted cases
and/or their caregivers about other sick persons or recent
deaths with similar symptoms who did not report to the
hospitals or died at their initial stage of illness. We
defined a cluster as 52 meningo-encephalitis cases
aged55 years living within 30 min walking distance of
each other who developed illness within 3 weeks of one
another. In rural Bangladesh villagers are quite knowl-
edgeable about the major events occurring in other
households within a village due to strong prevailing kin-
ship [14] and it usually requires <30 min towalk across a
village or workplace. The cut-off of 3 weeks was chosen
by adding the incubation period of NiV (1–10 days) and
period of transmissibility (6–11 days) [15]. If physicians
identified an admitted meningo-encephalitis case with
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51 sick persons with similar symptoms reported in his/
her community, they also considered that case as part
of a cluster. After identification of a cluster, surveillance
physicians collected illness and exposure histories from
cluster cases and/or their family members and blood
from the living cases.
Cluster investigation
When a cluster was identified, an investigation team
from IEDCR and icddr,b visited cases in the hospitals
and/or communities to determine the cluster size and
collect detailed epidemiological exposures using a
standard questionnaire. The time interval between in-
itial presentation of cases’ illnesses and visits of the in-
vestigation team to hospitals and/or communities
varied; therefore, many acute cases had either died
or their illness resolved by the time of investigation.
The team identified family members, relatives, neigh-
bours, friends and colleagues as the proxy respondents
for the dead or severely ill cases who were unable to
respond. The team also asked the cases and/or their
family members, relatives, neighbours, friends and




Active Nipah Surveillance Hospital
Passive Nipah Surveillance Hospital
1. Rangpur Medical College Hospital
2. Jaypurhat District Hospital
3. Naogaon District Hospital
4. Bogura Medical College Hospital
5. Rajshahi Medical College Hospital
6. Tangaii District Hospital
7. Meherpur District Hospital
8. Manikgonj District Hospital
9. Rajbari District Hospital











Fig. 1. Location of 10 surveillance hospitals in northwest and central Bangladesh.
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identify if there were other persons with fever and
altered mental status or convulsion, or recent deaths
with similar symptoms in their community. The objec-
tive of this investigation was to assess whether cases
within an observed cluster shared an exposure or if
they were clustered by chance. To establish epidemio-
logical linkages, the team explored whether clustered
cases lived together, were family members, resided in
the same village, or worked together; they investigated
common exposures such as drinking date palm sap,
contact with the sick person with similar illness, or
contact with sick animals. They also matched the ex-
posure dates and illness onset dates. When we identified
NiV clusters with epidemiological linkages, we con-
sidered whether clusters were most likely formed due
to person-to-person transmission of NiV or due to mul-
tiple NiV introductions from a common exposure to
date palm sap. In addition, the team collected blood
from living cases in hospitals or communities.
Laboratory procedures
The field team centrifuged blood and transported spe-
cimens to IEDCR on wet ice or liquid nitrogen. Before
2007, specimens were shipped to the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to test for
Nipah-specific IgM by enzyme immunoassay. Since
2007, IEDCR and icddr,b have tested specimens
using a Nipah-specific IgM ELISA provided by
CDC, which has a high sensitivity, specificity and con-
cordance with other Nipah-specific ELISAs [16]. CDC
retested all positive samples and every tenth negative
sample for reconfirmation and quality control.
Case-based Nipah surveillance
During the NiV transmission season (January–March),
we collected blood and CSF of all listed meningo-
encephalitis cases from Faridpur and Rajshahi
Medical College Hospitals from 2007 and from
Rangpur Medical College Hospital from 2008 to find
all NiV cases presenting to these hospitals in addition
to cluster-based surveillance. These three tertiary hospi-
tals were chosen for case-based surveillance because
large numbers of Nipah cases had been identified pre-
viously from the catchment areas of these hospitals.
Definition of Nipah case-patients
Confirmed Nipah case. We defined a laboratory-
confirmed NiV case as a meningo-encephalitis case
with detectable serum Nipah IgM antibody.
Probable Nipah case. We defined a probable case as a
meningo-encephalitis case who had epidemiological
linkages with a confirmed NiV case within 3 weeks’
of their illness but whose blood was not collected
due to death or the first blood sample was negative
and second sample was not collected due to death.
Isolated Nipah case. We defined an isolated NiV case
as a meningo-encephalitis case with detectable serum
Nipah IgM antibody but who was not part of a cluster
or who had no epidemiological linkages with any
other known probable or confirmed NiV cases even
if they were part of a cluster.
Data analysis
We categorized the clusters based on cluster size and
calculated the proportion of clusters where Nipah
cases were identified. We conducted χ2 analysis to de-
termine whether a cluster size of >3 was associated
with presence of Nipah cases within an identified
cluster.
Because of the public health importance of identify-
ing strains of NiV with an increased capacity for
person-to-person transmission, for the NiV clusters
with person-to-person transmission, we estimated R0
using the outbreak’s size or total number of indivi-
duals infected by the primary case to monitor the
human transmissibility of the different NiV outbreaks
and to detect if there were any possible differences in
transmissibility which could serve to highlight strain
differences [17, 18]. By definition, R0 measures the av-
erage number of cases infected by a single primary in-
fectious case. Therefore, one primary Nipah case will
produce R secondary Nipah cases in the first gener-
ation [19]. Each of these secondary cases will again in-
fect R persons, producing a total of R ×R =R2 cases
in the second generation, R3 cases in third generation
and so on. Hence, the total outbreak size (A) can be
expressed by the following geometric progression:
A = 1 +R +R2 +R3 + . . ., where 1 is the primary
case. For stuttering outbreaks when R0 < 1, the ex-
pression is reduced to A = 1/(1 – R), which means if
R = 0·9, the total outbreak size will be 10 (one primary
case and nine is the summation of secondary, tertiary,
etc. generation cases) [18]. Since outbreak size A is
known from detailed cluster investigation, we esti-
mated R0 as 1–1/A, from the reduced expression.
We calculated and compared proportions of NiV
yield by both cluster surveillance and case-based sur-
veillance. For cluster-based surveillance, we calculated
NiV yield as Nipah cases presenting to hospitals in
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clusters plus Nipah cases identified in the communities
or referred to hospitals by the investigation team. For
case-based surveillance, we calculated NiV yield as
sporadic Nipah cases presenting to three surveillance
hospitals.
Ethical approval
Healthy participants or legal guardians of the partici-
pants provided informed consent for participation.
The Ethical Review Committee of icddr,b reviewed




Between February 2006 and September 2011, surveil-
lance physicians listed 5887 encephalitis cases in 10
surveillance hospitals. In these cases, physicians iden-
tified 62 clusters. A total of 176 (3%) cases were in-
cluded in these 62 clusters; 147 were identified in
hospitals while 29 were identified from communities.
The median age of the clustered cases was 21 years
(interquartile range 7–40); 120 (68%) cases were
male. Seventy-four (42%) cases died (Table 1). At
least one patient died in 34 (55%) clusters.
A total of 127 (72%) samples were collected from
cases identified in clusters, and a single blood specimen
was collected fromat least one case in eachcluster.These
included specimens from 87 acute and 31 convalescent
cases. We collected both acute and convalescent blood
samples from nine cases. In 10 (17%) of 62 identified
clusters, we identified 62 Nipah cases. Of these, 32
Nipah cases presented at hospitals in clusters, while 30
were identified in communities. Twenty-eight were
laboratory-confirmedNipah cases and34wereprobable
cases. The yield for NiV infections from blood samples
of cluster-based surveillance was 22% (28 laboratory-
confirmed NiV infections/127 blood samples tested).
Forty-eight (78%) clusters were two-case clusters,
six (10%) were three-case clusters and the remaining
eight (12%) clusters had 4–20 cases (Fig. 2). In 43 two-
case clusters, cases had no common exposure or ap-
parent history of contact with each other. In only
one of these 43 two-case clusters without epidemiolo-
gical linkages, were we able to identify a laboratory-
confirmed Nipah case. In the other five two-case
clusters, both cases were from the same family. Two
of these five were Nipah clusters but the other three
clusters had no laboratory evidence of Nipah infec-
tion. One patient died from two of these three
non-Nipah clusters. In these two clusters where one
patient died, illness of both cases began on the same
day in one cluster and 1 week apart in the other.
None of the three-case clusters had any epidemiolo-
gical linkages or NiV infection among cases. The pres-
ence of Nipah cases within a cluster was associated
with cluster size >3 (P < 0·001). Among the eight clus-
ters having >3 cases, seven (88%) were Nipah clusters.
We identified epidemiological linkages between cases
in each of these seven clusters. We identified a total
of 57 Nipah cases in these seven Nipah clusters, either
laboratory-confirmed or probable. Of these 57 Nipah
cases, 47 (82%) patients died. Of the seven Nipah clus-
ters having epidemiological linkages, we identified evi-
dence of person-to-person transmission in four
clusters and multiple NiV introductions from date
palm sap for three clusters. The estimated R0 for the
four NiV clusters with person-to-person transmission
ranged from 0·75 to 0·88 (Table 2). One cluster of
five cases, which included two deaths and had no epi-
demiological linkages between cases, was not caused
by NiV and remains undiagnosed (Fig. 2).
Case-based Nipah surveillance
Between 2007 and 2011, we identified 982 patients
meeting the meningo-encephalitis case definition at
three tertiary surveillance hospitals participating in
case-based surveillance. Of these patients, 173 (18%)
died (Table 3). Surveillance physicians collected
blood samples from 608 patients of which 23 (4%)
were isolated laboratory-confirmed Nipah cases.
Table 1. Demographics, fatality and Nipah status of the
clustered encephalitis cases identified by cluster-based
surveillance, 2007–2011 (N = 176).









Blood specimens collected 127/176 (72%)
Nipah cases 62/176 (35%)
Confirmed 28/62 (45%)
Probable 34/62 (55%)
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DISCUSSION
In our setting of scarce resources with thousands of
encephalitis cases, cluster-based surveillance redirects
public health attention away from pathogens having
no demonstrated person-to-person transmissibility
and towards specimens of spatio-temporally clustered
cases that more likely represent stage III zoonotic
pathogens and pandemic threats. Ninety-seven per
cent of the listed encephalitis cases were excluded
from specimen testing for stage III zoonotic patho-
gens. Importantly, community-level investigations
allowed cluster-based surveillance to distinguish clus-
ters with epidemiological linkages from clusters with-
out epidemiological linkages. Out of the 62 clusters,
we identified epidemiological linkages in 12 clusters
of which nine were Nipah clusters. Because of this
efficiency, cluster-based surveillance has been used in
other settings [20, 21].
Our integrated surveillance data explain different
modes of introduction of stage III zoonotic pathogens
into human populations. We identified sporadic NiV
introductions from the case-based surveillance, and
two types of Nipah clusters or outbreaks with a high
fatality rate from cluster-based surveillance. One
type of Nipah outbreak occurred as a result of mul-
tiple introductions of NiV to humans; another type
occurred due to person-to-person transmission of
NiV. Analyses of the viral strains identified by cluster-
and case-based surveillance permit monitoring
changes of viral factors including person-to-person
transmission of such deadly pathogenic agents. We
identified four small short-lived Nipah chains of trans-
mission due to person-to-person transmission that had
NoNo  Yes No Yes 
8 clusters with  
>3 cases 48 two-case clusters 6 three-case clusters 
5887 encephalitis 
cases 
176 cases were 
in 62 clusters 
Were epidemiological links among 
cases identified during cluster 
investigation? 
Were epidemiological links among 
cases identified during cluster 
investigation? 
Were epidemiological links among 
cases identified during cluster 
investigation? 
7 Nipah clusters
(57 NiV cases) 
2 Nipah 
clusters 













1 Nipah cluster 
(one NiV case in 
this cluster) 
1 non-NiV case + 
1 NiV case) 
42 non-Nipah 
clusters 
 (84 non-NiV 
cases) 
43 clusters 
(86 encephalitis cases) 
5 clusters
(10 encephalitis cases) 
(both cases in each cluster 
were family members) 
1 cluster 
(5 encephalitis cases) 
7 clusters 
(57 encephalitis cases) 
Fig. 2. Summary of clusters identified through cluster-based surveillance, 2006–2011.










1 2007 7 0·86
2 2010 8 0·88
3 2011 4 0·75
4 2011 8 0·88
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R0 for NiV ranging from 0·75 to 0·88. The estimates
of R0 for the strains causing person-to-person trans-
mission were higher than our earlier estimates of the
average R0 for NiV in Bangladesh [7]. This is consist-
ent with the presumed heterogeneity of capacity for
person-to-person transmission among stage III zoonotic
agents [22]. Furthermore, NiV strains identified from
case-based surveillance or Nipah clusters with multiple
introductions from date palm sap, had no person-
to-person transmission and can be used as a comparison
group to understand transmission heterogeneity and to
explain why these infections failed to spread [23]. In ad-
dition to viral factors, community-level cluster investi-
gations and in-depth assessment of exposures also
help us to identify host risk behaviours associated
with increased person-to-person transmission. These
insights can guide the implementation of strategies to re-
duce the spread of infections during epidemics or pan-
demics. For instance, community investigations have
permitted development of acute interventions to reduce
exposures during outbreaks, and have contributed to
the development of broader longer term intervention
strategies to reduce exposures [24–26].
This study has some limitations. We did not explore
aetiological agents for non-Nipah clustered cases. The
114 non-Nipah cases were in three categories. First,
107 non-Nipah cases from 49 non-Nipah clusters
that had no epidemiological linkages between each
other. These were likely caused by common pathogens
with limited pandemic potential [27, 28]. Second, six
non-Nipah cases from three two-case non-Nipah clus-
ters that had epidemiological linkages between cases.
Temporal analysis of the symptom onset of the cases’
in these clusters suggests that cases likely had
co-infections or were infected by one or more
non-Nipah agents that had limited person-to-person
transmission capability. Since cases died in these clus-
ters, they are a priority for further diagnostic attention.
Collecting and testing specimens from such non-Nipah
clustered cases with epidemiological linkages as a part
of a rapid response could be considered as an appro-
priate investment of limited resources to identify or dis-
cover pathogens. Third, a single non-Nipah case from
a two-case Nipah cluster where we did not identify epi-
demiological linkage. We believe this cluster was
formed by chance and the non-Nipah cases were
infected by a common agent causing encephalitis.
In Bangladesh, as in other low-income countries,
aetiological diagnosis is not performed as part of clini-
cal evaluation of encephalitis cases; therefore, testing
of specimens for stage III pathogens is not routine.
Indeed, the cost for aetiological diagnosis of stage
III pathogens is high and may make surveillance pro-
hibitively expensive in low-resource settings if such
surveillance requires that all encephalitis cases are
tested. Individual case-based Nipah surveillance was
a supplemental approach of cluster-based surveillance
to identify isolated NiV introductions that would have
been missed by the cluster approach. Rational use of
resources for additional testing of all encephalitis
cases only during the Nipah transmission season and
only in limited hospitals where the greatest number
of encephalitis cases were admitted, provided sup-
plemental information about isolated introductions
of stage III zoonoses and improved the comprehen-
siveness of surveillance. We were able to establish a
targeted case-based surveillance for NiV due to its
known epidemiology, including seasonal transmission
period, in addition to the year-round cluster-based
surveillance that could provide information for mul-
tiple stage III pathogens having similar clinical presen-
tations. However, for unknown stage III pathogens,
lack of epidemiological information may limit the op-
portunity for targeted case-based surveillance.
Our surveillance had limited coverage with 10
government hospitals. We probably missed some
Table 3. Number of meningo-encephalitis patients identified at three tertiary hospitals through case-based














2007 56 16 — 72 18 (25%) 1
2008 69 60 66 195 38 (19%) 1
2009 135 10 84 229 13 (6%) 4
2010 82 113 57 252 52 (21%) 8
2011 55 60 119 234 52 (22%) 9
Total 397 259 326 982 173 (18%) 23
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clusters because some of the cases might have been ad-
mitted to other hospitals. For instance, this surveil-
lance activity missed one Nipah outbreak in 2007
because patients were admitted to a government hos-
pital that was not a surveillance hospital [12]. Many
meningo-encephalitis cases also might not have been
hospitalized due to the low healthcare utilization in
Bangladesh [29]. In addition, surveillance physicians
might have failed to list some patients, which might
have left some clusters undetected [10]. Physicians’ as-
sessment of whether two cases were of 30 min walking
distance from each other may occasionally be inaccur-
ate because they do not have precise geographical
knowledge about the catchment areas of hospitals.
We could not collect specimens due to death of
many clustered cases. This is another inherent limi-
tation of a cluster-based approach for infections with
a high case-fatality rate like NiV because of the time
lag between when initial cases are hospitalized and
the cluster is identified. Surveillance would be more ef-
fective if we could prioritize the rapid cluster identifi-
cation and deployment of a field investigation team
capable of collecting various diagnostic specimens in-
cluding post-mortem biopsies [30]. In addition, delays
between recognition of a cluster and deployment of a
field investigation team limit our capability to diag-
nose the early cases of NiV in a cluster and to respond
with prevention activities to contain the spread of in-
fection. Our calculation of R0 risks generating a
biased estimate of the mean transmissibility of all
NiV strains. However, the primary objective of this
surveillance is specifically to identify agents with unu-
sually high person-to-person transmission, rather than
estimating a general mean. All these limitations re-
duce the sensitivity of cluster-based surveillance; how-
ever, given the severe resource constraints in
low-income settings where emerging pathogens pose
the greatest threat, the integration of surveillance stra-
tegies provides a practical strategy for optimally fo-
cusing limited resources on identifying stage III
zoonotic pathogens.
Researchers have identified regions characterized as
emerging disease ‘hotspots’ where pathogens are more
likely to emerge [31]. Different stage III pathogens
with different case-fatality rates and different socio-
cultural settings and health systems may require differ-
ent approaches and integration. Integration of cluster-
based surveillance with other surveillance strategies
could be evaluated in other low-income settings in
emerging disease hotspots. Resources for surveillance
in the highest risk areas of emerging infections remain
scarce. Strategies to reduce cost have the potential to
widen the global surveillance net for identifying and
monitoring pathogens at highest risk for causing a
severe human pandemic.
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